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ABSTRACT 
Imagine playing a game of catch with three people, and all the things that would 
influence to whom you throw. Were thoughts of death included as one of those factors? 
The hypothesis that mortality salience motivates avoidant behavior toward a worldview-
threatening target was empirically tested on a sample of 200 undergraduate Caucasian 
college students from a Midwestern university. I induced participants to write about 
either their own death or dental pain, and presented them with summer descriptions of 
three fictitious male African American targets that they believed they were going to 
interact with later in the study. Targets' descriptions were manipulated to be either 
consistent, neutral, or inconsistent with American stereotypes commonly associated with 
African Americans. Participants completed several personality and attitude measures 
about themselves and targets, and then played a simulated game of catch called cyberball 
over the internet, supposedly with the three targets who were in different locations. 
Participants demonstrated a preference to toss the ball more to a stereotype 
inconsistent African American male target regardless of mortality salience condition or 
participants' individual level of need for closure. Attitude and trait ratings mirrored the 
above results, with the exception of attitude ratings toward the stereotype consistent 
target, in which need for closure moderated the effects of mortality salience. Participants 
in the mortality salience condition who were high in need for closure rated the stereotype 
consistent target less favorably than both neutral and stereotype inconsistent targets. 
These results suggest that mortality salience may not demonstrate the prominent 
effects on attitudes and behaviors that terror management theory has suggested (Solomon, 
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004). However, the results do imply that stereotypes 
influence behavioral interaction with and favorability toward African Americans. In 
accordance with research on the effects of social exclusion, the increased avoidance of an 
African American based on his or her consistency with prominent African American 
stereotypes may in fact evoke behaviors that validate these negative stereotypes (i.e., 
hostility, social loafing, and decreased cognitive ability) and thus perpetuate the 
stereotypes associated with African Americans. 
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With whom we interact is influenced by many factors and circumstances, ranging 
from simple immediacy (Latane, Liu, Nowak, Bonevento, & Zheng, 1995) to individual 
attitudes and preferences (Ickes, 1984). There is little doubt that stereotypes and prejudice 
influence with whom we interact and how we interact with them (Allport, 1954). 
However, recent research suggests that thoughts of death may actually influence these 
attitudes (Schimel et al., 1999) and behaviors (Ochsman & Mathy, 1994, as cited in 
Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004). According to terror management theory 
(Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 
1991), an awareness of death can influence how people act toward others (McGregor et 
al., 1998), with whom they associate (Deschesne, Greenberg, Arndt, & Schimel, 2000), 
and how they feel about themselves (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & 
Schimel, 2004b). The goal of the current study is to further understand the effects of 
mortality salience on social interactions. Specifically, it addresses whether mortality 
primes can elicit avoidance of a worldview-threatening target. 
Terror Management Theory 
Terror management theory (Greenberg et al., 1986; Solomon et al., 1991) was 
inspired by the writings of Ernest Becker (1973, as cited in Solomon et al., 2004) and 
proposes that the awareness of inevitable death creates internal conflict with instinctual 
desires for continued existence. This conflict, if unmanaged, would create paralyzing 
terror that would engross all cognitive functioning. An essential assumption of terror 
management theory (TMT) is that humans have adapted to this paralyzing fear by 
distracting themselves with various cultural conceptions ofreality using (a) cultural 
world views and (b) self esteem to buffer the anxiety and hence manage the terror 
associated with death (Solomon et al., 2004). 
According to TMT, cultural worldviews are socially validated, self-constructed 
beliefs about the world that serve to shield individuals from the paralyzing realization of 
their own mortality (Solomon et al., 2004). Self-esteem is then acquired through 
believing in the validity of these worldviews and the perception that one is living up to 
the standards of value associated with one's worldviews (Pyszczynski et al., 2004b). 
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So how do worldviews and self-esteem protect people from their underlying fear 
of death? TMT proposes that people have a need to believe (at least unconsciously) that 
they are part of a meaningful existence that endures past their own death. Validation of an 
individual's worldview concordantly validates the assumption that all of his or her 
worldviews and beliefs are accurate, making the thought of his or her own death less 
frightening (Arndt, Cook, & Routledge, 2004). This validation is hypothesized to create a 
personal feeling of significance and meaningfulness in the world that also mitigates the 
terror association with death (Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1992; Pyszczynski et al., 
2004b). Similarly, self-esteem helps deal with fears of non-existence because it also 
creates feelings of importance and meaningfulness, removing the fear of simply being a 
transient being in a meaningless world (Pyszczynski et al.). From a TMT perspective, 
living up to one's own cultural standards of value imbues a sense of literal or symbolic 
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meaningfulness that is achieved through any number of avenues, such as adherence to 
religious beliefs (Jonas & Fischer, 2006), identification with a larger group (Arndt, 
Greenberg, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2002), identification with 
accomplishments (Dechesne, Greenberg, et al., 2000), or even belief in symbolic 
immortality through reproduction (Solomon et al., 1991 ). A central tenet of TMT is the 
hypothesis that if a psychological structure's purpose is to provide protection from the 
fear of death, then the need for this structure should be increased when death is salient 
(Dechesne et al., 2003; Greenberg et al., 1990; Pyszczynski et al., 2004b; Rosenblatt, 
Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). In well over 200 studies, research has 
shown that both self-esteem and faith in one's cultural worldview act as buffers against 
the anxiety caused by a cognitive awareness of death (Pyszczynski et al.). Increased self-
esteem, whether experimentally induced or dispositionally inherent, reduces the effects of 
mortality salience (i.e., increased death thought accessibility or anxiety; see Pyszczynski 
et al. for review). Similarly, mortality salience increases favorability ratings of those who 
support one's worldviews and decreases favorability of those who threaten these 
worldviews ( e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990). In fact, mortality salience increases aggression 
toward and derogation of worldview-threatening targets (McGregor et al., 1998). 
Interestingly, worldview defense does not occur directly after becoming aware of 
one's own mortality. People often deny their vulnerability to death when mortality is in 
focal attention but not after a delay or distraction, suggesting that there are two distinct 
defenses against the inherent fear of death (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 
1997; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997). First, proximate 
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thoughts of death are suppressed to protect against the anxiety induced by the awareness 
of death. Then, when death is not in immediate focal attention, ~istal defenses are enacted 
that symbolically defend against the unconscious knowledge of death by necessitating 
unconscious or instinctual urges to validate one's cultural worldviews ( Greenberg, Arndt, 
Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2000; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & 
Breus, 1994). For this reason, research using explicit manipulations of mortality salience 
often use distracter tasks such as the positive and negative affect scale (PANAS; Watson 
& Clark, 1994), short excerpts unrelated to death such as the Growing stone distraction 
task (Greenberg et al., 1994), or even word puzzles (Greenberg et al.). 
Although delay and distraction are standard methodological practices, proximate 
defenses can also be circumvented by using subliminal primes, such as presenting the 
word "DEATH" for 42.8 ms (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, et al., 1997; Landau, 
Goldenberg, et al., 2006) or the numbers 911 to American participants (Yum & Schenck-
Hamlin, 2005). Simply being in immediate proximity of a funeral home can enact the 
effects of mortality salience, increasing death-thought accessibility and the need to 
validate cultural worldviews (Pyszczynski et al., 1996). The fact that these primes are 
found to be just as effective suggests that mortality primes could be more prevalent than 
once thought, and could be influencing more behavior than many would like to believe. 
Mortality salience (MS) has a multitude of effects on individuals' attitudes. 
Mortality salience increases preferences for a worldview-validating target (Greenberg et 
al., 1990), increases self-reported affiliation with winning sports team (Dechesne, 
Greenberg, et al., 2000), and even leads to more positive evaluations of a worldview-
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validating target (Mikulincer & Florian, 1997). The influence of mortality salience is not 
restricted to attitudes, however. Thoughts of death cause participants to sit farther from a 
worldview-threatening target (Ochsmann & Mathy, 1994 as cited in Solomon et al., 
2004), decrease peoples' comfort with and compliance in desecrating a flag or using a 
crucifix as a hammer (Greenberg, Simion, Porteus, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1995), and 
even increase how much a person will donate to a particular charity (Jonas, Greenberg, & 
Frey, 2003). Mortality salience can increase fitness activity (Arndt, Schimel, & 
Goldenberg, 2003) and has been found to influence peoples' driving behaviors 
(Taubman-Ben-Ari, 1999). Overall, mortality salience demonstrates a great breadth of 
influence on both attitudes and behaviors alike. 
Criticisms ofTMT 
Terror management theory is often criticized for its perspective on the function of 
self-esteem. According to TMT, self-esteem functions as an anxiety buffer from the 
existential fear of death, which suggests that mortality salience should elicit actions to 
bolster self-esteem (see Pyszczynski et al., 2004b for review). Leary (2004) argues that 
self-esteem serves no such function, citing research that found no differences between 
experimental and control conditions in enhancement of self-evaluations after a mortality 
salience prime (Sowards, Moniz, & Harris, 1991 ). In rebuttal, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Arndt, and Schimel (2004a) pointed out that Sowards et al. (1991) failed to 
incorporate a delay or distraction after the mortality salience prime, which is necessary to 
elicit self-esteem bolstering as a distal defense to thoughts of death (Arndt, Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2000; Greenberg et al., 1994). 
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Further research cited by Leary and Schreinndorfer (1997) opposing the 
hypothesis that self-esteem serves as an anxiety buffer from thoughts of death found that 
self-esteem scores are significantly lower immediately after mortality salience in 
comparison to baseline scores (Chaudhary, Gardiner-Parks, & Hass, 1994, as cited in 
Leary & Schreindorfer, 1997). This finding directly contradicts what TMT would predict, 
suggesting that self-esteem may not serve to protect against the anxiety associated with 
thoughts of death. Although TMT researchers have not accounted for this unexpected 
decrease in self esteem immediately after a death prime, Pyszczynski et al. (2004a) 
suggest that Chaudhary et al. 's (as cited in Leary & Schreindorfer) results should remain 
suspect because of unexpected changes in self-esteem scores that were also observed in 
control conditions, suggesting that this decrease could be caused by something other than 
mortality salience. 
Critics have also criticized terror management theory on a conceptual level, 
pointing out that a psychological structure that evolved to protect against the fear of death 
would have no evolutionary benefit (Leary & Schreindorfer, 1997). How could 
something that works to shield or distract from thoughts of death be evolutionarily 
beneficial? Fear is inherent for a reason and is necessary for survival. TMT does not 
disagree with this claim but suggests that the realization of absolute annihilation is 
paralyzingly frightening and cultural worldviews help to distract from thoughts of death 
in order to properly function (Pyszczynski et al., 2004a). It does not suggest in any way 
that this psychological process makes humans any worse at detecting life threatening 
situations. Others have similarly criticized TMT's assumption that death elicits a 
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"paralyzing" fear because there is no evidence for this (Leary, 2004). In rebuttal, 
Pyszczynski et al. suggest that the lack of direct evidence of this fear actually supports 
the theory, because all "functioning adults have been socialized into a worldview imbued 
with meaning and personal significance" (p. 487). 
According to terror management theory, humankind's needs for culture and self-
esteem are thought to have evolved gradually along with their emergent awareness of 
death (Pyszczynski et al, 2004b). However, Leary (2004) has criticized this aspect of 
TMT, stating that culture is a relatively recent phenomenon, emerging around 40,000 
years ago. He suggests that TMT has major conceptual problems in the theoretical 
explanation of how or why self-esteem would have emerged as an evolutionarily adaptive 
mechanism to protect us from thoughts of death which, problematically, did not occur 
until relatively recently in our ancestral past. In response to this criticism, Pyszczynski et 
al. (2004a) points out that although "culture" is thought to be a relatively recent 
occurrence in evolution, it was still a gradual process that dates back much further then 
Leary suggested. There is evidence of ritual burial of the dead up to 100,000 years ago, 
long before this genuinely accepted appearance of culture. This archeological evidence 
demonstrates that early hominids were aware of death and had a general form of culture 
that was passed down through generations, suggesting that "culture" is a much older 
construct than previously thought. 
Another criticism of terror management theory is its strict adherence to the 
assumption that death (i.e., absolute and utter non-existence) is mankind's greatest fear 
and is thus at the core of the phenomena TMT purports to explain (Leary, 2004). Many 
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researchers adamantly disagree with TMT's proclamation, and suggest that these same 
effects can be explained in a more parsimonious way. Of these arguments, two different 
hypotheses arise in an attempt to explain why the anxiety associated with thoughts of 
death elicits an increased need to validate cultural worldviews and bolster self-esteem: (a) 
aversive thoughts and (b) uncertainty. 
Some researchers suggest that worldview validation and self esteem-bolstering 
are not unique to thoughts of death but are common to all aversive events such as pain, 
social exclusion, or even giving a public speech. In support of this hypothesis, trait self-
esteem is unrelated to thoughts of death and is in fact negatively correlated with thoughts 
ofrejection, suggesting that social exclusion may actually create more anxiety than 
thoughts of death (Leary & Schreindorfer, 1997). Leary (2004) suggests that social 
exclusion calls into question a person's relational value (i.e., self-esteem) and, according 
to sociometer theory, should elicit self-esteem bolstering not because of increased 
thoughts of death but because thoughts of exclusion lower self-esteem. According to 
sociometer theory, self-esteem is a metaphoric gauge that, when low, enacts processes to 
increase self-esteem to a normal level (Leary, 2004). Others suggest that social exclusion 
and ostracism may also lead to increased death-thought accessibility because the act of 
being ostracized threatens one's self-esteem and simultaneously demonstrates what it 
would be like essentially to not exist (Dechesne & Kruglanski, 2004). However, repeated 
research using social exclusion (Landau, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Martens, 
2006; Schimel, et al., 1999, study 4) and other aversive events such as thoughts of 
experiencing intense pain (Greenberg et al., 1994, study 2), dental pain (Schimel et al., 
study 2), failure (Hirshberger, Florian, & Mikulincer, 2005, study 1 ), an upcoming exam 
(McGregor et al., 1998, study 1 ), and giving a public speech (Greenberg et al., study 2) 
have failed to produce effects that replicate those associated with thoughts of death 
(Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). 
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The uncertainty hypothesis similarly suggests that TMT researchers have actually 
been studying the effects of uncertainty elicited from thoughts of death, creating an 
increased need for worldview validation and self-esteem bolstering (Leary, 2004). 
Supporting research has found that trait self-esteem is more strongly related to thoughts 
of uncertainty than those of non-existence (Leary, Saltzman, & Bednarski, 1995, as cited 
in Leary & Schreindorfer, 1997). Thoughts of death obviously do entail a great deal of 
uncertainty, making it difficult to differentiate whether thoughts of death cause bolstering 
of self-esteem or whether it is actually the uncertainty associated with death that impacts 
self-esteem. Support for the uncertainty hypothesis shows that evidence of an afterlife 
moderates the effects of mortality salience, suggesting that thoughts of death may not 
actually be directly responsible for increasing the need for worldview validation and self-
esteem bolstering (Deschesne et al., 2003). Further research has found that threats to an 
individual's cultural worldview increase the accessibility of words associated with death 
(Schimel, Hayes, Williams, & Jahrig, 2007) and that bolstering of self worth reduces 
death-thought accessibility (Mikulincer & Florian, 2002). These results suggest that 
although uncertainty may be inherent in thinking about death, and play a moderating role 
in the relation between the anxiety associated with thoughts of death and worldview 
validation, worldview-threats have a unique relation to thoughts of death. 
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Need for Closure Moderating Mortality Salience 
In response to criticisms of TMT that suggest that the effects of mortality salience 
could be due to the uncertainty associated with death, terror management theorists turned 
to lay epistemic theory and the concept of cognitive need for closure. Kruglanski, 
Webster, and Klem (1993) operationalize need for closure (NFC) as a cognitive desire for 
certainty and avoidance of ambiguity. According to lay epistemic theory (Kurglanski, 
1989), people high in NFC desire quickly to attain information but then are no longer 
motivated to process any further information relevant to the topic, thus avoiding any 
discrediting information (Kruglanski et al., 1993). Those high in NFC essentially find 
uncertainty aversive, and accordingly attempt to avoid this aversive state by accepting 
any immediate information that would provide closure. Those low in NFC, however, are 
more at ease with uncertainty and demonstrate less avoidant behavior toward uncertainty 
(Kruglanski et al.). The culmination of this research on individual differences in NFC 
suggests that there could be individual variation in responses to the uncertainty associated 
with death, creating the possibility that NFC could have a moderating role in an 
individual's response to mortality salience. 
Research integrating lay epistemic theory and TMT finds that those who score 
high in NFC react differently to mortality primes than those who score low. People who 
score high in NFC (vs. those who score low) utilize much more rigid strategies to deal 
with the uncertainty associated with death. As an example, when an individual's in-group 
is criticized, people who score high in NFC will defend the group by derogating the critic 
(Dechesne, Janssen, & van Knippenberg, 2000). They are also more susceptible to the 
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fear inherent in thinking about death and attempt to avoid the ambiguity and uncertainty 
associated with death. When given an extended period of time to write about thoughts of 
death, those who score high in NFC have shorter responses and respond more quickly 
than those low in NFC. When given the opportunity only to write one sentence about the 
feelings that death evokes, individuals who score high in NFC express distress and 
avoidance (Dechesne, Janssen, et al.). 
Those who score low in NFC are not totally unaffected by mortality salience, 
however. Need for closure simply helps determine the nature of reactions to mortality 
salience (Dechesne, Janssen, et al., 2000). Those who score low in NFC favor self-
enhancing strategies to manage their concerns about death (Dechesne & Kruglanski, 
2004). For example, when faced with a worldview-threatening target who criticized 
participants' in-group (i.e., nationality), those low in NFC distanced themselves from the 
criticized group to preserve a positive sense of self, instead of derogating the critic 
(Dechesne, Janssen, et al., 2000). Those low in NFC can do this because they are less 
avoidant of uncertainties, and thus can be more flexible in their response to mortality 
salience conditions. They are also less avoidant of the uncertainty inherent in 
contemplating mortality and are therefore more curious about death and consequently 
take more time responding and respond in greater detail to questions about death 
(Dechesne, Janssen, et al.). When forced only to write one sentence about the feelings 
that death creates, people who score low in NFC tend to write about general acceptance 
and curiosity about their own death (Dechesne & Kruglanski, 2004). 
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According to lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski, 1990), those who score high in 
NFC are more likely to use and rely on stereotypes because these constructs provide 
certainty and an organized view of the world (Dechesne & Kruglanski, 2004). This 
preference for certainty is also related to strong preferences for similar others and a 
strong aversion toward those who express dissimilar opinions (Kruglanski & Webster, 
1991). In fact, Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, and De Grada (2006) suggest that high NFC 
is associated with a syndrome they describe as "group-centrism," which is characterized 
by increased group conformity, in-group favoritism, out-group derogation, political 
conservatism, and rejection of those who deviate from the norm (Krunglanski, Shah, 
Pierro, & Mannetti, 2002; Shah, Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1998). According to TMT, 
these preferences for stereotypes and increased use group identification should then be 
exaggerated after mortality salience. Accordingly, after MS, participants who score high 
in NFC demonstrate increased in-group identification (Dechesne, Janssen, et al., 2000), 
recall more stereotypic information (Dechesne, Janssen, et al.), and demonstrate 
increased preferences for a stereotype-confirming individual (Schimel et al., 1999) 
compared to those who score low in NFC. 
Stereotypes, Prejudices and Preferences 
Stereotypes are often considered to be socially validated categorizations of 
individuals or groups that serve to provide order to the world ( e.g., Allport, 1954). This 
categorization also serves a self-protective function in which downward comparison 
increases personal feelings of self worth and value (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to 
TMT, thoughts of death should elicit increased use of these categorizations because they 
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provide self-affirming feelings of meaningfulness and provide order to the universe 
(Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996). Supporting evidence 
finds that Christians attribute more negative stereotypic traits toward a Jewish target after 
mortality salience (Greenberg et al., 1990). Similarly, United States college students 
make more stereotypic personality trait ratings of Germans when thoughts of death are 
primed compared to control conditions (Schimel et al., 1999). 
Mortality salience not only increases stereotype activation, but it also influences 
with whom participants identify. Thoughts of death increase identification with, and 
favorability toward, similar others and concordantly decrease identification with and 
favorability toward those who are dissimilar ( e.g., Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, 
Solomon, & Chatel, 1992; see Greenberg et al., 1997 for review). For example, White 
participants identify with and demonstrate more sympathy toward a White racist 
advocating White pride vs. an African American racists advocating Black pride after 
mortality salience compared to those experiencing control conditions, who are more 
sympathetic toward the African American racist (Greenberg, Schimel, Martens, Solomon, 
& Pyszczynski, 2001). 
Schimel et al. ( 1999) suggests that the mere existence of dissimilar world views 
threatens an individual's faith in his or her own personal world views, enacting negative 
behaviors and attitudes (i.e., prejudice, hostility, and derogation) toward those who hold 
worldview-threatening views. From this perspective one should like an individual who 
acts according to one's cultural worldview and dislike those who threaten this worldview 
(Greenberg et al., 1990). Rosenblatt et al. (1989) tested this general hypothesis by 
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presenting college students, and in a later study actual judges, with a case of an alleged 
prostitute, finding that mortality salience increased subsequent bail bond 
recommendations from both students and judges alike. An increased awareness of death 
can make even those prized for impartialness (i.e., judges) adhere more strictly to their 
cultural world views of morality. 
If thoughts of death lead to increased preferences for worldview-validating 
information, resulting in lower evaluations of worldview-threatening targets (Greenberg 
et al., 1990), increased in-group identification (Dechesne, Janssen, et al., 2000), and 
increased stereotype activation (Schimel et al., 1999), then it is logical to assume that 
mortality salience would cause participants to prefer a stereotype-consistent target (i.e., a 
worldview-validating target) over a stereotype-inconsistent target (i.e., a worldview-
threatening target). To test this hypothesis, Schimel et al. had participants read essays 
about three African American students' summer vacations and rate their attitudes toward 
each after a mortality salience prime or a similarly matched control condition. The race of 
the target and the stereotype-consistency of targets' essays were manipulated, resulting in 
four conditions: African American stereotype-consistent, African American stereotype-
inconsistent, African American neutral, and White neutral. Control participants preferred 
the stereotype inconsistent African American student (i.e., a worldview-threatening 
target) over the stereotype-consistent. After MS, however, participants preferred the 
stereotype-consistent African American (i.e., a worldview-validating target) over the 
stereotype inconsistent African American. 
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Subsequent studies replicated these findings by manipulating the stereotypicality 
of applicants for two gender stereotypical jobs (Study 4) and the stereotypicality of a 
homosexual male (Study 5). Participants preferred a worldview-validating target after 
mortality salience, demonstrating significantly lower ratings of the worldview-
threatening target (i.e., the stereotype inconsistent target). Control conditions preferred 
the worldview-threatening target and rated the worldview-validating target significantly 
lower in favorability ratings. Interestingly, Study 5 also included a measure of NFC and 
found that the increased preference for a worldview-validating target in mortality salience 
conditions was moderated by NFC, with only those high in NFC demonstrating this 
preference. Those low in NFC were unaffected by mortality salience, and generally rated 
the stereotype-consistent target more positively than the stereotype-inconsistent target. 
These findings imply that people high in NFC prefer a target who confirms their cultural 
world views when death is salient, regardless of the specific stereotype content. Any 
information that validates an individual's cultural world views helps them to deal with the 
anxiety associated with thoughts of death, especially in people who score high in NFC. 
Current Study 
Mortality salience can increase stereotypic thinking (Schimel et al., 1999, Study 
1), identification with an in-group (Arndt et al., 2002; Dechesne et al., 2003), and 
preferences for a stereotype confirming individual (Schimel et al., Study 3, 4, & 5), but 
there has been very little research examining the implications of these findings. There are 
only a handful of studies linking TMT with explicit behaviors, such as derogation or 
aggression toward those who threaten this stereotypic worldview (Dechesne, Janssen, et 
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al., 2000, McGregor et al., 1998). McGregor et al. assessed aggression by measuring how 
much hot sauce participants gave targets, finding that mortality salience caused increased 
aggression toward a worldview-threatening target. Interestingly, further studies (Study 2 
& 3) suggest that that derogation and aggression may serve the same terror management 
function in that participants either derogated or demonstrated aggression toward a 
worldview-threatening target depending on which opportunity was presented first. If 
participants were first given a chance to derogate the target, there were no differences in 
hot sauce allocation. If they were first given the chance to give the target hot sauce 
however, they did not derogate the threat. 
Although hostility may be one response to these worldview-threats, Solomon et 
al. (2004) suggest that thoughts of death can also lead to avoidance of a worldview-
threatening target, especially for participants high in NFC. The only research to date 
linking TMT and avoidance found that mortality salience primes caused German 
participants to sit closer to a German confederate who validated their cultural worldview 
and further from a Turkish confederate who criticized their worldviews (i.e., criticized 
participants' nationality; Ochsman & Mathy, 1994, as cited in Solomon et al., 2004). 
Although this study could be interpreted as demonstrating avoidance of a worldview-
threatening target, it could also be interpreted as demonstrating increased in-group 
identification. Participants could merely have been identifying with a fellow German who 
advocated similar views (i.e., an in-group member) and thus sitting further from a 
Turkish confederate advocating dissimilar views (i.e., indicative of an out-group 
member). 
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Mortality salience can cause any number of behavioral and attitudinal effects such 
as derogation (Dechesne, Janssen, et al., 2000), aggression (McGregor et al., 1998), and 
increased in-group identification (Greenberg et al., 2000). More importantly to the 
current study, thoughts of death have led to increased favorability toward a worldview-
validating out-group member and decreased favorability toward a worldview-threatening 
out-group member (Schimel et al., 1999). 
Avoidance may, in fact, be related to this type of decreased favorability. White 
participants avoided interacting with an African American confederate after observing 
another African American confederate act negatively (e.g., hostile), and this avoidance 
was reflective of participants' negative attitudes (Henderson-King & Nisbett, 1996). In 
fact, avoidant behavior is most likely to occur toward a disliked target (Kuppens, Van 
Mechelen, & Meulders, 2004). These findings suggest that negative attitudes or 
preferences are related to avoidant behaviors. Together with literature on TMT, these 
findings suggest that thoughts of death will create a decreased preference or favorability 
toward a worldview-threatening target, and this preference could then lead to avoidance. 
However, no published study to date has explicitly tested whether mortality salience will 
lead to increased avoidance of a world view-threatening target. For the purposes of the 
current study, avoidance is operationalized as the intentional and purposeful lack of or 
decrease in interaction with a specific individual. The current research is intended to 
demonstrate that mortality salience increases participants' need for worldview validation 
and efforts to maintain these worldviews, leading to avoidance of a worldview-
threatening target through social exclusion. 
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Cyberball (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000) is a computer simulated game of 
catch used to manipulate feelings of social exclusion. Ostracism through cyberball creates 
the same feelings of social exclusion as demonstrated in previous research paradigms 
such as physical ball tossing (Williams et al., 2000, Williams et al., 2002), or imagining 
life alone (Baumeister, Twenger, & Nuss, 2002; Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004). 
Although no published studies have yet used cyberball as a dependent measure, this 
paradigm is ideal for measuring avoidance, assuming tossing behavior is indicative of 
intentional interaction. Through the use of cyberball, interactions can be completely 
controlled without the use of confederates, whose individual characteristics can introduce 
confounds into a study. The computer program tells the individual who is throwing and 
receiving. Number of tosses, both to the participant and to other targets, can be controlled 
by the experimenter. Participants can choose to whom to throw by selecting the picture 
associated with the player, and the program records tosses to and from each target 
(Williams, 2007; Williams & Jarvis, 2006). 
In accordance with terror management theory and previous research, the current 
study will test the following hypotheses. 
Hl. After MS, participants will toss the ball more frequently to the stereotype 
consistent target than the stereotype inconsistent target. 
H2. After MS, participants will rate the stereotype consistent target higher on 
both attitude and trait favorability measures than the stereotype 
inconsistent and neutral targets. 
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H3. The effects of MS will be moderated by participants' need for closure; 
only those high in NFC will be significantly affected by MS in frequency 
of tosses and favorability ratings. Participants low in NFC will be 
unaffected by MS. 
H4. In the control conditions, participants will toss the ball more to, and have 
an increased preference for, the stereotype inconsistent target. 
CHAPTER2 
METHOD 
A Priori Effect Size 
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Effect sizes from similar studies conducted by Schimel et al. (1999, studies 3, 4, 
& 5) had an average Cohen's d effect size index of .74 whereas studies from McGregor et 
al. (1998) using aggression measures had an average effect size of .46. For the purposes 
of this study, a more conservative effect size estimate was used of .40. A priori power 
analysis suggested that a sample size of at least 168 would be necessary to achieve a 
power of .95 in the current study. 
Participants and Design 
Two-hundred psychology students from a Midwestern university (Mage= 18.68, 
SD= 1.15; 143 females, 57 males) were randomly assigned to experimental conditions in 
a 2 (condition: death vs. dental pain) X 3 (target: stereotype consistent vs. stereotype 
inconsistent vs. neutral) mixed design in exchange for course credit. 
Procedure 
The White male experimenter greeted each participant individually and instructed 
him or her to sit at a desk equipped with a computer. The experimenter then stated, in 
correspondence with the cover story, that this was a cooperative study with another 
graduate student from Tennessee State University entitled "Impression formation" in 
which they would be interacting with three other students from UNI or TSU via the 
internet. The experimenter further explained that the intent of this study was to assess 
how people perceive others from very minimal information, and how these perceptions 
change with interaction. In addition, the experimenter instructed participants that this 
study would also examine whether people's perceptions of how they are perceived by 
others is congruent with actual perceptions by others, and whether interaction increases 
the accuracy of these self-perceived impressions. 
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After acquiring consent, the experimenter explained that a pivotal part of first 
impressions are people's reactions to how others look, thus requiring a picture to be taken 
of each participant. The experimenter took a picture of each participant and instructed 
him or her to begin the experiment by clicking "start" on the computer screen. The 
experimenter then left the room, supposedly to upload the picture. All further instructions 
( 
and measures were administered via the computer. 
Each participant first wrote a short essay describing his or her summer (see 
Appendix A) under the guise that these descriptions would be circulated among 
participants. The instructions informed participants that their picture, along with their 
essay, was the only information available for the other students to create a first 
impression. In congruence with the cover story, participants rated themselves using an 
attitude and trait questionnaire as they thought the other students would perceive them 
from only the information they have provided. Participants then completed four 
"personality" measures, including need for closure (Kruglanski et al., 1993), the mortality 
attitudes personality survey about death or dental pain (Rosenblatt et al., 1989), the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule - Expanded form (Watson & Clark, 1994), and an 
opinion questionnaire on "The Growing Stone" taken from Albert Camus's Exile and the 
Kingdom (I 957, as cited in Greenberg et al., 1994). 
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Rosenblatt et al. 's (1989) Mortality Attitudes Personality survey (see Appendix 
B) consists of a set of open-ended questions about mortality or dental pain and was used 
as the manipulation of mortality salience. Experimental conditions were instructed to: 
"Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you" 
and "Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you 
physically die and once you are physically dead." Control conditions were given two 
similar questions regarding dental pain, stating "Please briefly describe the emotions that 
the thought dental pain arouses in you" and "Jot down, as specifically as you can, what 
you think will happen to you as you experienc<t dental pain and once you have physically 
experienced dental pain" (Greenberg et al., 1994; Schimel et al., 1999). 
After completion of these measures, participants read three fictitious students' 
summer descriptions that were modified to be stereotypically consistent, neutral, or 
inconsistent with prevalent American stereotypes of African Americans. Descriptions 
were based on Schimel et al. (1999, study 3) and were modified for believability (see 
Appendix C). Modifications of essays were based on media portrayals of African 
Americans and were intended to utilize the most prevalent American stereotypes of 
African Americans such as "unintelligent," "musical," "promiscuous," and "athletic" 
(Devine & Elliott, 1995). The stereotype inconsistent description was presented with no 
colloquialisms or grammatical errors and stated that the target spent the summer working 
for a software company while taking summer classes. The neutral description referred to 
spending the summer as a lifeguard, hanging out with friends, watching movies, and 
playing video games. The stereotype consistent description referred to spending the 
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summer playing basketball and enjoying the nightlife. This description incorporated 
stereotypic slang along with nonstandard grammar such as "me and my boyz," "lookin 
for honies," and getting "crunked." Each description was presented in association with 
one of three pictures of African American males. Descriptions were presented in the same 
order (i.e., stereotype inconsistent, neutral, stereotype consistent) while the pictures 
associated with each description were presented in a counterbalanced order. Pictures 
consisted of three standard headshots of smiling African American males in front of a 
blue background (courtesy of Dr. Christian Meissner, UTEP; see Appendix D). 
After advancing to the next page, participants then played a game called cyberball 
(Williams et al., 2000) with the three targets under the belief that these were actual 
students. Cyberball (see Appendix E) is played on a computer in which participants are 
included in a game of catch (see Williams et al., 2000 for review). Participants choose 
who to throw to by selecting the picture of the player (Williams et al.). The program was 
set to toss the ball to the participant 43% of the time. The instructions to the game told 
participants not to focus on actually throwing or catching the ball, but to use the game to 
assist in visualizing the other players and what they are like. After agreeing that they had 
read and understood the instructions, participants played cyberball for a duration of 60 
tosses. Participants then completed items assessing perceived frequency of ball tosses to 
the three fictitious students and rated their attitudes toward these individuals and 
themselves using similar trait and attitude questionnaires to those used previously. As 
manipulation checks, participants also indicated the race of each student and rated how 
stereotypic each student was on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from (1) not at all 
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stereotypical to ( 6) extremely stereotypical. Once completed, the experimenter came back 
into the room, probed the participant for suspicion, thoroughly debriefed him or her, and 
then thanked each participant for his or her time. 
Measures 
Need for Closure 
Need for closure (a= .85; see Appendix F) was assessed using a 42-item scale in 
which participants rated their level of agreement on a 6-point Likert scale with statements 
such as: "I think that having clear rules and order to work is essential for success" and "I 
enjoy having a clear and structured mode oflife." The scale is intended to assess an 
individual's cognitive need for closure and avoidance of ambiguity. Previous research has 
found this measure to be highly reliable with a Cronbach's alpha of .84 and test-retest 
reliability of .86 (Kruglanski et al., 1993). This measure demonstrates acceptable 
convergent and discriminant validity, being slightly correlated with authoritarianism (r = 
.27), intolerance of ambiguity (r = .29), dogmatism (r = .29), impulsivity (r = .27), the 
fear of invalidity scale (r = -.21 ), need for cognition (r = -.28), and IQ (r = -.17) and is 
not correlated with the Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability scale (r = -.02; Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994; see Kruglanski et al., 1997 for review). 
PANAS-X 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule- Expanded form (see Appendix G) 
has participants rate themselves on 60 trait items such as "cheerful," "bold," "at ease," 
and "energetic" on a 5-point Likert scale from not at all (1) to extremely (5; Watson & 
Clark, 1994 ). This measure has eleven affective subscales consisting of fear ( a = . 82), 
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hostility (a= .80), guilt (a= .82), sadness (a= .79), joviality (a= .90), self assurance (a 
= . 75), attentiveness ( a = .65), shyness ( a = .85), fatigue ( a = . 79), serenity ( a = . 77), and 
surprise (a= .69), along with two higher order scales consisting of positive and negative 
affect (a's = .80, .85, respectively). This scale has a test-retest reliability ranging from .59 
to. 71 on the higher order scales and has convergent correlations with six scales from the 
Profile of Mood States (POMS) ranging from .85 to .91, suggesting relatively strong 
construct validity. The PANAS-X also demonstrates moderately strong internal 
discriminant validity between scales, with coefficients ranging from -.05 to -.35 between 
positive affect scales and negative affect scales (see Watson & Clark for review). 
The Growing Stone 
A short excerpt was taken from "the Growing Stone," from the collection Exile 
and the Kingdom by Albert Camus (1957, as cited in Greenberg et al., 1994; see 
Appendix H). This excerpt is commonly used in the literature as a distraction task 
because of its neutral affective tone and lack ofreferences to death (Greenberg et al., 
1994). After reading the excerpt, participants indicated how descriptive the excerpt was 
on a 6-point Likert scale and whether they thought the author was male or female. 
Attitude and Trait Measures 
The measure evaluating participants' attitudes toward themselves and targets (a's 
> . 81 ; see Appendix I) consisted of 7 statements such as "I think I would like this 
person," and "I am interested in getting to know this person," which participants rated on 
6-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree ( 1) to strongly agree ( 6; Schimel et 
al., 1999). Participants identified the three different targets by their picture, which was 
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located above each attitude measure. Self-rated attitude measures were changed slightly 
(e.g., "I think people will say that I'm a nice person," "I think people will say they would 
be interested in getting to know me"). 
Participants also rated themselves and targets on 12 traits (as> .71) consisting of 
"intelligent," "conceited," "nice," "arrogant," "antisocial," "trustworthy," "hostile," 
"hardworking," "athletic," "friendly," "freeloader," and "productive" on 6-point Likert 
scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (extremely) using the same methodology listed 
above (Schimel et al., 1999). These items remained the same for self-ratings. 
Percent of Tosses 
Number of tosses to each target was measured via cyberball. Percent of tosses to 
each target was calculated by dividing participants' frequency of tosses to each target by 
their total number of tosses. 
Perceived Frequency of Ball Tosses 
Participants rated how often they received the ball from each student and how 
often they threw the ball to each student, identified by his or her picture, on a scale from 
0-100% of the time (see Appendix J). 
Manipulations Check 
Participants indicated the race of each target and rated how stereotypical each 
target was for his or her race on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all 
stereotypical) to 6 (very stereotypical). Participants also rated how similar each target 
was on a similar 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all similar) to 6 (very 





Seventeen participants were excluded due to their race ( only data from 
Caucasians were used) and an additional five for incorrectly identifying the race of the 
targets. Of the remaining 178 participants, 26 displayed suspicion as to the true nature of 
the study during debriefings. Analyses conducted with and without these participants 
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demonstrated similar trends; thus these 26 suspicious participants were included in all 
further analyses to conserve power. Due to technical problems associated with cyberball, 
11 of the remaining 178 participants' frequency of ball tosses data were not recorded; 
however, their data were used in all other analyses. 
Manipulation Checks 
Consistent with previous research (Greenberg et al., 1994; Schimel et al., 1999), a 
one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOV A) on the 11 affective subscales of 
the PANAS-X found that mortality salience had no effects on mood (Fs < 2.55). 
Repeated measures t-tests were used to determine the stereotypicality of the 
targets. The stereotype consistent target was rated as more stereotypical (M = 4.27, SD= 
1.23) than both the neutral target (M= 2.50, SD= 1.05), t(l 74) = 15.72,p < .001, d= 
2.40, and the stereotype inconsistent target (M= 2.01, SD= .86), t(l 74) = 20.17,p < .001, 
d = 3.08. Consistent with expectations, the stereotype inconsistent target was rated as 
being less stereotypical than the neutral target, t(l 74) = 6.93,p < .001, d= 1.06. 
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Hypothesis Tests 
· Percent of Ball Tosses 
ANCOV A. To avoid problems with multicollinearity, only the percent of tosses 
to the stereotype consistent and stereotype inconsistent targets were used. Percent of ball 
tosses were then analyzed using a 2 (condition: death vs. dental pain) X 2 (target: 
stereotype consistent vs. stereotype inconsistent) X 2 (need for closure: high vs. low, 
based on a median split) mixed ANCOV A. An initial analysis included age, political 
\-
orientation, family socioeconomic status (SES), current SES, and sex as covariates1• 
Because the first four variables had no effect on the results (ps > .14 ), the analysis was re-
run using sex as the only covariate. 
There was a significant main effect of target, F(l, 162) = 6. 97, p = . 01, 112 = . 04, in 
which participants tossed the ball more to the stereotype inconsistent target than the 
stereotype consistent target (see Figure 1). Contrary to predictions, mortality salience did 
not affect participants' tossing behaviors, F(l, 162) = .002,p = .97, 112 < .01. The two-
way interaction of target by condition was not significant, F(l, 162) = .51,p = .48, 112 < 
.01 (see Figure 2). 
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Note. Values represent adjusted means. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
Percent of ball tosses to the neutral target is included for comparison purposes only and 
was not included in the analysis. n = I 67 
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Note. Values represent adjusted means. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. n 
= 167 
Figure 2. Percent of ball tosses as a function of condition and stereotypicality. 
The main effect of NFC was not significant, F(l, 162) = .05,p = .83, 112 < .01. 
Contrary to predictions, the two-way interaction of target by level of NFC was not 
significant, F(l, 162) = .01,p = .93, 112 < .01. Similarly, the three-way interaction of 
condition by target by NFC was not significant, F(l, 162) = 2.54,p = .11, 112 = .02 (see 
Table 1). Neither mortality salience, NFC, nor their interactions had a significant effect 
on percent of ball tosses. 
Table 1 
Cell Means for the Three-Way Need for Closure X Condition X Stereotypicality 
Interaction on Percent of Ball Tosses. 
Need For Closure 
High Low 
MS Control MS Control 
Target Madj SE Madj SE Madj SE Madj SE 
Stereotype consistent .34 .01 .31 .01 .32 .01 .33 .01 
Stereotype 
.33 .01 .35 .01 .35 .01 .34 .01 inconsistent 
Note. n = 167 
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Regression Analysis. Because of problems with using a median split, three 
hierarchical regressions were also used to determine whether NFC moderated the effects 
of mortality salience. Need for closure was standardized into z-scores to avoid problems 
with multicolinearity among variables as outlined by Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004; for 
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further explanation see Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) and for ease of 
interpretation (Aiken & West, 1991). Percent of ball tosses to each target was predicted 
using the standardized NFC, mortality salience, and their interaction as independent 
variables. Sex, condition, and the standardized z-scores of NFC were all entered in the 
first step, with the interaction of condition and the standardized NFC z-scores entered in 
" the second step. Contrary to hypotheses, neither NFC, MS, nor their interaction 
significantly predicted percent of ball tosses (ps > .37; see Table 2). 
Table 2 
Multiple Regression Results: Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Changes 
in R2 on Percent of Ball Tosses Controlling for Sex. 
Percent of Tosses 
Step and Predictor Stereotype Neutral Stereotype Consistent Inconsistent 
Step 1 
Sex .04* -.04* .00 
MS .01 -.00 -.01 
NFC -.00 .00 .00 
R2 
.05 .08 .00 
Adjusted R2 .03 .06 -.02 
Step 2 
Sex .04* -.04* .00 
MS .01 -.00 -.01 
NFC -.01 .01 .00 
MS X NFC .01 -.01 -.01 
~R2 .01 .00 .00 
R2 .06 .08 .01 
Adjusted R2 .03 -.06 -.02 




ANOVAS. Mean attitude ratings were computed for each target to determine 
which target participants preferred. Data were analyzed using a 2 (mortality salience: 
death vs. dental pain) X 3 (target: stereotype consistent ys. neutral vs. stereotype 
inconsistent) X 2 (need for closure: high vs. low) mixed ANCOV A. An initial analysis 
found that the covariates of age, political orientation, family SES, current SES and sex 
had no effects on the results (ps > .43); therefore, they were removed from further 
analysis to conserve power. Attitude favorability ratings mirrored the results of percent of 
ball tosses; the main effect of condition and the two-way interaction of target by 
condition were not significant (F(l, 174) = .14,p = .71, ri2 < .01, F(2, 348) = .38,p = .68, 
ri2 < .01 respectively; see Figure 3). However, there was a significant main effect of 
target, F(2, 348) = 127.87,p < .001, ri2 = .47. Participants rated the neutral (Mactj = 4.61, 
SE= .05) and stereotype inconsistent (Mactj = 4.71, SE= .05) targets more favorably than 
the stereotype consistent target (Mactj = 3.72, SE= .07) regardless of condition, t(l 77) = 
12.44,p < .001, d = 1.88, t(l 77) = 12.66,p < .001, d = 1.91, respectively (see Figure 4). 
There was no difference between neutral and stereotype inconsistent targets in attitude 
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EJ Mortality Salience II Dental Pain 
Note. Values represent adjusted means. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
Scale ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 6 (Strongly Agree). n = 178 
Figure 3. Attitude ratings as a function of condition and target stereotypicality. 
Stereotype Consistent Neutral Stereotype Inconsistent 
Note. Values represent adjusted means. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
Scale was from 1 (not at all) to 6 (extremely). n = 178 
Figure 4. Attitude favorability ratings as a function of target stereotypicality. 
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The main effect of NFC was not significant, F(I, 174) = 1.56,p = .21, 112 = .01, 
nor was the interaction of target by NFC, F(2, 348) = 1.14, p = .32, 112 = .01. The three-
way interaction was also not significant, F(2, 348) = 2.91,p = .06, 112 = .02, suggesting 
that neither MS, NFC, nor their interaction significantly affected participants' attitude 
favorability ratings (see Table 3). 
Table 3 
Cell Means for the Three-Way Need for Closure X Condition X Stereotypicality 
Interaction on Attitude Ratings. 
Need For Closure 
High Low 
MS Control MS Control 
Target Madj SE Mactj SE Mactj SE Madj SE 
Stereotype 3.44 .14 3.79 .15 3.93 .15 3.73 .13 
consistent 
Neutral 4.58 .10 4.60 .10 4.58 .11 4.68 .09 
Stereotype 4.67 .09 4.70 .10 4.79 .10 4.69 .09 inconsistent 
Note. n = 178 
Regression Analyses. Three hierarchical regressions were used to determine 
whether NFC moderated the effects of mortality salience on attitude favorability using 
similar procedures as described for analysis of percent of ball tosses. Need for closure 
explained a significant proportion of variance in attitude scores toward the stereotype 
consistent target, R2 = .06, F(l, 174) = 3.59,p = .02. Although NFC did not moderate 
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attitude favorability ratings for the neutral or stereotype inconsistent targets, there was a 
significant interaction of condition by NFC in attitude ratings toward the stereotype 
" 
consistent target, B = -.34, t(I 74) = 2.43,p = .02, jj.R2 = .03, /j.F(l, 174) = 5.92,p = .02 
(see Table 4). 
Two more hierarchical regressions controlling for MS condition were used to 
determine how NFC moderated the effects of mortality salience on attitude favorability 
toward the stereotype consistent target (Baron & Kenny, 1986). In the mortality salience 
condition, participants scoring higher in NFC rated the stereotype consistent target less 
favorably, B = -.33, t(83) = 3.31,p = .001, and NFC explained a significant proportion of 
the variance in favorability, R2 = .11, F(l, 83) = 10.97,p = .001. Need for closure, 
however, had no influence on attitude ratings toward the stereotype consistent target in 
the control condition, B = .01, R2 < .0I,p = .92. 
Table 4 
Multiple Regression Results: Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Changes 
in R2 on Attitude Favorability Ratings. 
Attitude ratings 
Step and predictor Stereotype Neutral Stereotype Consistent Inconsistent 
Step 1 
MS -.06 -.05 .02 
NFC -.15* -.01 .02 
R2 
.03 .00 .00 
Adjusted R2 .02 -.01 -.01 
Step 2 
MS -.06 -.05 .03 
NFC .01 .02 .05 
MSXNFC -.34* -.05 -.06 
~R2 
.03* .00 .00 
R2 
.06 .00 .00 
Adjusted R2 .04 -.01 -.01 
Note. * p < .05; n = 178 
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ANOVAS. Mean trait ratings were also computed to determine how positively 
participants would rate each target and were analyzed using a 2 (mortality salience: death 
vs. dental pain) X 3 (target: stereotype consistent vs. neutral vs. stereotype inconsistent) 
X 2 (need for closure: high vs. low) mixed ANOVA. An initial analysis found that the 
covariates of age, political orientation, family SES, current SES, and sex had no effects 
on the results (ps > .06); therefore, they were removed from further analysis to conserve 
power. The main effect of condition and the two-way interaction of target by condition 
was not significant, F(l, 176) = 1.12,p = .29, 112 = .01, F(2, 348) = 1.37,p = .25, 112 = .01, 
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respectively (see Figure 5). There was a significant main effect of target, F(2, 348) = 
297.43,p < .001, 112 = .63, in which participants' trait ratings were more positive for the 
stereotype inconsistent target (Mactj = 4.87, SE= .03) than the neutral target (Mactj = 4. 70, 
SE= .04), t(I 77) = 5.19,p < .001, d = .78, and the stereotype consistent target (Mactj = 
3.82, SE= .05), t(l 77) = 20.12,p < .001, d = 3.04 (see Figure 6). In fact, the stereotype 
consistent target was rated the lowest, with significantly lower ratings than the neutral 
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Stereotype Consistent Neutral Stereotype Inconsistent 
El Mortality Salience II Dental Pain 
Note. Values represent adjusted means. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
Scale ranged from 1 (Not at All) to 6 (Extremely). n = 178 
Figure 5. Trait ratings as a function of condition and target stereotypicality. 
Stereotype Consistent Neutral Stereotype Inconsistent 
Note. Values represent adjusted means. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
Scale ranged from 1 (Not at All) to 6 (Extremely). n = 178 
Figure 6. Trait ratings as a function of target stereotypicality. 
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Further analyses determining whether NFC moderated the effects of mortality 
salience on trait ratings of targets found similar results; the three-way interaction was not 
significant F(2, 348) = .24,p = .79, 112 < .01 (see Table 5), nor was the interaction of 
target by NFC, F(2, 348) = .69,p = .50, 112 < .01. The main effect of NFC was also not 
significant F(l, 174) = .04,p = .83,, 112 < .01. Hierarchical regressions supported the 
above results, finding that NFC did not moderate the effects of MS on trait ratings (ps > 
.47; see Table 6). 
Table 5 
Cell Means for the Three-Way Need for Closure X Condition X Stereotypicality 
Interaction on Trait Ratings. 
Need For Closure 
High Low 
MS Control MS Control 
Target Mactj SE Madj SE Madj SE Madj SE 
Stereotype 3.75 .09 3.85 .09 3.86 .10 3.80 .08 
consistent 
Neutral 4.76 .07 4.72 .08 4.72 .08 4.62 .07 
Stereotype 4.92 .07 4.82 .07 4.95 .07 4.80 .06 inconsistent 
Note. n = 178 
Table 6 
Multiple Regression Rg_sults: Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Changes 
in R2 on Trait Favorability Ratings. 
Trait ratings 
Step and predictor Stereotype Neutral Stereotype Consistent Inconsistent 
Step 1 
MS -.01 .07 .12 
NFC -.07 .03 .02 
R2 
.01 .01 .02 
Adjusted R2 .00 .00 .01 
Step 2 
MS -.01 .07 .12 
NFC -.04 .06 .03 
MSXNFC -.07 -.05 -.02 
~R2 
.00 .00 .00 
R2 
.02 .01 .02 
Adjusted R2 -.00 -.00 .01 





ANOV AS. Three items from the attitude favorability scales were combined ("I 
would avoid this person," "I would not talk to this person," and "I would not interact with 
this person") to create a self-reported avoidance index for each target ( as > . 75). A 2 
(condition: death vs. dental pain) X 3 (target: stereotype consistent vs. neutral vs. 
stereotype inconsistent) X 2 (need for closure: high vs. low, based on a median split) 
mixed ANCOV A was then conducted utilizing this new avoidance index as the 
dependent variable. Again, an initial analysis included age, political orientation, family 
SES, current SES, and sex as covariates. None of the covariates were significant (ps > 
.39) and the analysis was re-run without any covariates. 
As with the behavioral measure, there was a significant main effect of target, F(2, 
-
348) = 66.63,p < .001, 112 = .28, in which participants' ratings for avoidance were highest 
for the stereotype consistent target (see Figure 7). Interestingly, MS and NFC did seem to 
have marginal effects on these self-reported avoidance ratings. Participants tended to 
have higher avoidance ratings toward all three targets in the mortality salience condition 
(M= 2.19, SE= .07) compared to the control condition (M= 2.01, SE= .07), F(l, 174) = 
2.81,p = .10, 112 = .02. Correspondingly, those who were categorized as high in NFC 
tended to have higher avoidance ratings of all three targets (M = 2.20, SE= .07) than 
those categorized as low in NFC (M= 2.00, SE= .07), F(l, 174) = 3.66,p = .06, 112 = .02. 
However, none of the ensuing 2- or 3-way interactions were significant (ps > .16) 
6 
1 
Stereotype Consistent Nel1trnl Stereotype Inconsistent 
Note. Values represent adjusted means. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
Scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). n = 178 
Figure 7. Self-reported avoidance as a function of target. 
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Regression Analysis. Three hierarchical regressions were used to determine 
whether NFC moderated the effects of mortality salience on this avoidance index. Need 
for closure, MS, and their interaction had no significant effect on avoidance ratings 
toward the neutral and stereotype inconsistent targets, ps > .28. However, the model 
significantly predicted avoidance for the stereotype consistent target, F(3, 174) = 2.90,p 
= .04, but NFC did not moderate the effects of MS, B = .30, R2 = .05, 6F(l, 174) = 2.95, 




Multiple Regression Results: Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Changes 
in R2 on Avoidance Ratings. 
Trait ratings 
Step and predictor Stereotype Neutral Stereotype Consistent Inconsistent 
Step 1 
MS .16 .21 .18 
NFC .18 .03 -.04 
R2 
.03 .02 .02 
Adjusted R2 .02 .01 .00 
Step2 
MS .15 .21 .18 
NFC .05 .02 -.07 
MSXNFC .30 .02 .06 
t::,.R2 
.02 .00 .00 
R2 
.05 .02 .02 
AdjustedR2 .03 .01 -.00 
Note. n = 178 
Perceived Percentage of Tosses 
Perceived percentage oftosses to each target were rather strongly correlated with 
actual tosses, average within-cell r = .53,p < .001. Perceived percentage of ball tosses 
were analyzed using a 2 ( condition: death vs. dental pain) X 2 (target: stereotype 
consistent vs. stereotype inconsistent) X 2 (need for closure: high vs. low, based on a 
median split) mixed ANOV A. An initial analysis found that the covariates of age, 
political orientation, family SES, current SES, and sex had no effects on the results (ps > 
.15), and were removed from further analysis. The main effect of target was not 
significant, F(l, 174) = 2.73,p = .10, 112 = .02. The main effects of condition and NFC 
were also not significant, F(l, 174) < .01,p = .99, 112 < .01, F(l, 174) = .01,p = .93, 112 < 
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.01, respectively. Similarly, the 2-way interactions of target by condition, and target by 
NFC were not significant, F(l, 174) = .10,p = .75, 112 < .01, F(l, 174) = .69,p = .41, 112 < 
.01, respectively. The 3-way interaction was also not significant, F(I, 174) = .17,p = .68, 
112<.0l. 
Sex Differences 
Interestingly, there was a marginally significant interaction of target by sex on 
observed percentage of ball tosses when sex was a covariate, F(l, 162) = 3.53,p = .06, 112 
= .02. Independent samples t-tests indicated that there were significant sex differences in 
percent of tosses to the stereotype consistent target, t(165) = 2.72,p < .01, d = .43, in 
which men tossed the ball more to the stereotype consistent target than women (see 
Figure 8). However, there were no significant sex differences in percentage of tosses to 
the stereotype inconsistent target, t(I65) = .06,p = .95, d= .01. 
To determine whether the sex difference was due to men throwing the ball more 
often to the stereotype consistent target or women throwing the ball less often to that 
target, I compared men's and women's percent of tosses to each target to chance (33%) 
using one-sample t-tests. Men did not differ from chance in tossing behavior toward the 
stereotype consistent or stereotype inconsistent targets, ps > .21. However, women tossed 
the ball to the stereotype inconsistent and neutral targets significantly more often than 
would be expected by chance, t(l 17) = 2.42, p = .02, d = .45, t(l 17) = 2.81, p < .01, d = 
.52 respectively. They also tossed the ball to the stereotype consistent target significantly 
less often than would be expected by chance, t(l 17) = 2.95,p < .01, d = .55. 
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Independent samples !-tests also indicated sex differences in attitude favorability 
toward the stereotypic target, t(l 76) = 2.27, p = .03, d = .34. Men tended to have higher 
attitude favorability ratings for the stereotype consistent target than women (see Figure 
9). However, there were no significant sex differences for the neutral or stereotype 
inconsistent targets (ps > .25). Interestingly, there were no sex differences in trait ratings 
for any of the three targets . 
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Multiple paired samples t-tests were conducted on participants' similarity ratings 
toward each target. The stereotype inconsistent (M= 3.18, SD= 1.03) target had higher 
similarity ratings than the stereotype consistent target (M = 2.13, SD = 1.03, t(l 76) = 
9.18,p < .001, d= 1.38. The neutral target (M= 3.54, SD= 1.04), however, was rated as 
the most similar, having significantly higher similarity ratings than both the stereotype 
consistent, t(l 76) = 13 .62, p < .001, d = 2.05, and the stereotype inconsistent targets, 
t(175) = 3.53,p < .01, d= .53. 
Self-Ratings 
A 2 (mortality salience: death vs. dental pain) X 3 (time: pre vs. post) X 2 (need 
for closure: high vs. low) mixed ANOV A was used to determine whether MS affected 
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attitudinal self-ratings. There was a significant main effect of time, indicating that 
participants had higher attitudinal self-ratings at the beginning of the study compared to 
the end, F(l, 174) = 49.11,p < .001, 112 = .22 (see Figure 10). However, MS and NFC 
seemed to have no effect on these attitude ratings. The main effects of condition and NFC 
were not significant, F(l, 174) = .88,p = .35112 = .01, F(l,174) = 1.97,p = .16, 1,2= .01, 
· respectively. Similarly, the three-way interaction and both two-way interactions were not 
significant (ps > .34 ). 
Self-ratings on trait items also showed a significant main effect of time, which 
indicated that participants rated themselves lower on trait ratings at the beginning of the 
study compared to the end, F(l, 174) = 11.43,p < .01, 112 = .06 (see Figure 10). Again, 
MS and NFC had no effect on these ratings as indicated by the lack of significance in 
their main effects, F(l, 174) = 1.14,p = .29, 112 = .01, F(l, 174) = 2.15,p = .14, 112 = .01 
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Although previous research has demonstrated that Caucasian participants' 
preference for stereotype confirming information may be influenced by mortality salience 
, (Schimel et al., 1999), this study demonstrated that the effects of mortality salience may 
not be as pervasive as once speculated. Mortality salience did not cause participants to 
avoid a stereotype threatening target as measured by their frequency of tosses, nor did it 
affect participants' preferences. In fact, in this study, mortality salience had little to no 
effects on participants whatsoever. 
Participants threw the ball more often to the stereotype inconsistent target than the 
stereotype consistent target regardless of mortality salience or need for closure (NFC). 
Participants also preferred the stereotype-inconsistent target in both attitude and trait 
ratings, demonstrating a similar trend to their tossing preferences. There are several 
reasons why this might have occurred. Schimel et al. (1999) found that participants had a 
preference for a stereotype inconsistent target in control conditions, where death was not 
primed. Terror management theory's basic postulate is that worldview validation is a 
distal defense enacted when thoughts of death are not in immediate focal attention, 
requiring the use of distraction tasks (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, et al., 1997). 
However, thoughts of death do not stay on one's mind forever. This decay suggests that 
the effects of mortality salience are limited to a specific duration of time, creating the 
possibility that the distraction tasks used in this study may have taken too long. 
49 
Participants played cyberball approximately 10 after the MS prime, making it possible 
that behaviors and attitudes were assessed after participants had already dealt with the 
unconscious awareness of their own mortality. The fact that the results of attitude and 
trait ratings, assessed even later in the study, mirrored the results of toss percentage data, 
provide further support for the possibility that thoughts of death were no longer primed 
' when participants were playing cyberball. However, the distraction tasks employed in 
this study were the exact same as those in previous research (Greenberg et al., 1994; 
Schimel et al., 1999), suggesting that thoughts of death should have been primed. 
Explicitness of Cyberball 
Assuming thoughts of death were primed, it is also possible that cyberball and the 
act of playing catch with three other individuals may have been too explicit. Previous 
research using very similar methodologies to the current study have demonstrated that 
mortality salience causes participants to derogate or even aggress toward a worldview-
threatening target (e.g., McGregor et al., 1998). However, the methodologies used in 
these studies allowed participants to remain anonymous, assessing derogation through 
written critiques of essays (Dechesne, Janssen, et al., 2000) or aggression through 
allocation of hot sauce to a target in another room (McGregor et al.). Research in the 
aggression literature commonly finds that people are more likely to be aggressive when 
they are anonymous or in states of deindividuation (Zimbardo, 2004). Perhaps cyberball 
was too explicit a measure and participants felt identifiable. In the paradigm, participants 
were led to believe that their picture acted as an identifier for the other students to choose 
to whom to throw. This lack of anonymity may have caused participants to be influenced 
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by social desirability, making them more likely to attempt to equally distribute tosses to 
all targets and therefore negating any measurable effects of mortality salience. 
Evidence from self-reported avoidance ratings, however, suggests that the 
explicitness of cyberball was not an issue. The self-reported avoidance indices computed 
from attitude favorability measures were congruent with overt behavior. Participants 
· · reported higher avoidance ratings toward the stereotype consistent target than the neutral 
or stereotype inconsistent target, and these ratings were unaffected by mortality salience. 
Perceived percentage of tosses demonstrated a similar pattern and was not affected by 
mortality salience. However, these toss percentage estimations were highly correlated 
with actual percentage of tosses to each target, suggesting that participants may have 
simply been honestly estimating how often they tossed the ball to each target. Together, 
the results of these two extra measures suggest that anonymity may not have been a 
major issue with the study. However, it should be noted that these measures were not 
intended to be dependent measures and were not placed at times that would be optimally 
affected by mortality salience, and thus may not be adequate measures of avoidance in 
relation to thoughts of death. 
Worldview-Threats and TMT 
Another possibility explaining why mortality salience had little to no effect on 
results deals with how people generally react to worldview-threats after mortality 
salience. Research in TMT finds that participants will either derogate or aggress toward a 
worldview-threat, depending on which option comes first (McGregor et al., 1998). This 
differential usage suggests that derogation or aggression has a cathartic effect in regard to 
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worldview validation. In regard to the current study, participants may have differentially 
interacted with targets at the beginning of the game and later changed behavior as 
negative attitudes toward the worldview-threat decreased. However, the patterns of tosses 
in the data do not suggest that participants differentially preferred any of the targets at 
the beginning of the sessions compared to the end. In fact, participants generally tended 
to toss the ball to targets in a circular pattern throughout sessions. 
As stated previously, there is a strong possibility that death may have no longer 
been primed when participants were given the attitude and trait ratings toward targets due 
to the duration of time that elapsed after the mortality salience prime. These measures 
were taken approximately 15-20 minutes after the death prime, whereas previous 
literature suggests that distraction tasks should take approximately 3-5 minutes (T. 
Pyszczynski personal communication, October 2, 2008). However, there is evidence that 
mortality salience did still have an effect even after this extensive time span. According 
to regression analyses predicting attitude favorability, need for closure moderated the 
effects of mortality salience on attitude ratings toward the stereotype consistent target, 
suggesting that death may have still been primed when completing attitude and trait 
measures. Participants high in need for closure rated the stereotype consistent target less 
positively, but only in the mortality salience condition. Participants in the control 
condition were unaffected and demonstrated no preference. 
This finding, that MS decreased favorability toward a worldview-validating 
target, is in direct contradiction with hypotheses and previous findings in the TMT 
literature that have demonstrated that mortality salience increases preferences for 
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stereotype confirming information, and that this preference is generally seen only in those 
high in need for closure. However, this single finding may actually demonstrate that 
mortality salience did cause participants to prefer a worldview confirming target. 
Mortality salience may have caused participants to prefer a target that confirmed their 
moral values (i.e., validated their worldviews of morality). Rosenblatt et al. (1989) 
· demonstrated that people prefer information that is congruent with their moral values 
after mortality salience and subsequently demonstrated that these values influenced 
sentencing of an alleged prostitute. Perhaps the descriptions used to manipulate 
stereotypicality primed moral values in participants, causing them to differentiate targets 
by their consistency with participants' own moral values instead of consistency with 
stereotypes. 
In support of this moral values possibility, there was a significant sex difference 
in percentage of ball tosses and attitude favorability in which men seemed to prefer and 
toss the ball more to a stereotype consistent target than women did. Again, this preference 
in tossing behavior could be due to the manipulation of stereotypicality. The stereotype 
consistent target spoke of women as objects and was presented as being more 
promiscuous than the neutral and stereotype inconsistent targets. Because of the way in 
which the stereotype consistent target was represented, specifically in regard to attitudes 
and behaviors toward women, women may have reacted even more harshly toward the 
stereotype consistent target than men. 
An alternative explanation for the observed sex difference in tossing behavior 
may be related to each sex's general use and need for stereotypes. Men are generally 
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higher in social dominance orientation, which is characterized by attitudes that endorse 
inequality in favor of one's in-group (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994 ). In fact, Sidanius 
et al. state that "SDO is conceptually and empirically related to beliefs and attitudes such 
as racism, nationalism, and political conservatism" (p. 999). One possibility is that men 
may have preferred and tossed the ball more to the stereotype consistent target than 
· women because of this endorsement of stereotypical beliefs that would coincide with 
their world view. However, comparisons showed that women were the only participants to 
be significantly impacted by the targets' stereotypicality, throwing to the stereotype 
consistent target less often and the stereotype inconsistent target more often than 
expected by chance. This finding further supports the hypothesis that perhaps women 
were responding to the content of the stereotype consistent description. 
Self Ratings 
Interestingly, analysis of self ratings found that both attitude and trait self-ratings 
were significantly different from pre-interaction to post, but not in the same direction. 
Attitude ratings decreased after playing cyberball, but trait ratings actually increased. 
These self-ratings were not affected by mortality salience, suggesting that some other 
variable influenced attitude and trait ratings differentially. It is important to note that 
participants were instructed to complete these measures as they thought the other 
fictitious students would rate them. Perhaps being exposed to the three out-group targets 
influenced self-perceptions out of comparison. Attitude ratings were framed in a more 
behavioral context ( e.g., "I think this person would be interested in socializing with me"). 
Perhaps after discovering that all three targets were African American, participants felt 
like more of an out-group member due to their race thus influencing participants' self 
judgments negatively. 
54 
Participants rated themselves more positively on generally stable trait dimensions 
after interacting with the three targets, suggesting that they did feel better about 
themselves after interaction. This increase in trait self-ratings could be the result of 
· participants comparing themselves to the other three targets. However, in the context of 
the questions asked, this conclusion seems inappropriate. Participants were rating 
themselves as they thought the other students would rate them. Participants may have 
thought that the other fictitious students would rate them higher because they were the 
only White participant in the session, and stereotypes toward Whites are more commonly 
positive rather than negative (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). Another possibility is that 
due to being the only out-group member, participants may have had an increased need to 
bolster self-esteem on these stable trait dimensions that are generally considered 
dispositional, whereas lower scores on the attitude measures could be explained through 
situational contexts ( e.g., "all the other students were African American or dissimilar 
from myself'). Due to the nature of the study, it is very difficult to determine why these 
self ratings were differentially influenced. 
Implications 
Terror Management Theory 
The results of this study demonstrate that the effects of mortality salience may not 
be as omnipresent as once proposed. Previous literature suggesting that mortality salience 
influences overt behavior such as derogation and aggression have never explicitly tested 
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the theory in regard to avoidance of a worldview-threat. To date, there is only one 
unpublished study that demonstrates that mortality salience causes participants to avoid a 
worldview-threatening target (Ochsman & Mathy, 1994, as cited in Solomon et al., 
2004). Although this study could have very easily demonstrated avoidance of a 
worldview-threat, it also could have merely demonstrated that mortality salience 
· increased in-group identification, leading participants to sit closer to a fellow in-group 
member. 
The current study incorporated a measure to identify whether results were merely 
an artifact of increased in-group identification. Although participants rated the stereotype 
consistent target as the least similar to themselves and consequently tossed the ball less 
often to this target in comparison to the other targets, the neutral target was rated as being 
most similar. Participants threw the ball relatively equally to the stereotype inconsistent 
and neutral target, suggesting that avoidance was not a result of increased in-group 
identification. 
Related to this increased in-group identification hypothesis, it could also be 
argued that participants may have felt like more of an out-group member if they believed 
the target was from another school (i.e., the target was not only a different race, but was 
also from a different school). In the study, participants were told that the targets could be 
from their school or a different one (Tennessee State University; TSU), and some may 
have assumed that the African American targets were from Tennessee because of the 
relatively low prevalence of African Americans at their school. However, chi square 
analysis showed that only the neutral and stereotype consistent targets were categorized 
as being from TSU significantly more often than expected by chance2 suggesting that 
behavioral and attitude preferences were not a result of increased in-group (i.e., school) 
identification. 
It could also be argued that if results were due to group identification, women 
would be most affected because all targets were men, making women a double or even 
'triple out-group member (i.e., the targets were not only African American and from 
another school, but they were all a member of the other sex as well). However, as 
discussed earlier, women were more discriminatory toward the targets based on their 
perceived consistency with African American stereotypes, which further suggests that 
participants' avoidant behavior was not related to group identification, but was in fact 
directly influenced by the stereotypicality of the targets. 
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The results of this study also imply that attitudes (vs. behaviors) may be more 
strongly influenced by mortality salience. Effect sizes are far greater in studies using 
attitude measures ( e.g., Schimel et al., 1999) than those using behavioral measures ( e.g., 
McGregor et al., 1998). Although the current study failed to find significant effects of 
mortality salience, effect sizes related to preferences and behavior toward each target 
demonstrated a similar trend to that of previous research. The effect sizes were far greater 
for attitude and self-report measures than for behavioral measures. This attitude-behavior 
disparity further suggests that although mortality salience does influence attitudes and 
behavior, the ramifications may be less pronounced than TMT would suggest (i.e., 
Solomon et al., 2004). 
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Stereotypes and Prejudice 
Interestingly, the results of this study demonstrate that people will attempt to 
avoid interaction with, and report general dislike for, an African American who confirms 
their stereotypes in comparison to an individual that discredits these stereotypes. This 
differential avoidance results in two very different implications. First, this demonstrates 
· that people will interact more with African Americans who are inconsistent with their 
stereotypes, suggesting that prejudiced attitudes may not be strictly associated with an 
African American's race, but to the extent he or she confirms those stereotypes. Research 
on Dovidio and Gaertner' s (1998) Integrated Model of Racism suggests that political 
conservatives, in particular, may use stereotypes to justify prejudice and report less 
prejudice toward those targets who are less stereotypical (Harton & Nail, in press; 
Harton, Wadian, Nguyen, & Nail, 2009; Nail, Harton, & Decker, 2003; also see 
Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick, 1991). 
The second, and more pessimistic, implication of this study suggests that avoiding 
stereotypical African Americans will only perpetuate the problem. This avoidance may 
result in actual social exclusion or feelings of social exclusion, which has its own 
negative effects on the person being excluded. Social exclusion often evokes feelings of 
distress in the person being ostracized and has been found to activate parts of the brain 
associated with actual exposure to physical pain (Eisenberger, Lieverman, & Williams, 
2003).Being excluded can increase hostility (Downey & Feldman, 1996; Downey, 
Frietas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998; Feldman & Downey, 1994), reduce self-esteem 
(Williams et al., 2000; Zadro et al., 2004), create social loafing (Williams & Sommer, 
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1997), increase avoidance of social interactions that could result in further exclusion 
(Downey & Feldman, 1996), and even impair cognitive performance on complex 
cognitive tasks (Baumeister et al, 2002). Interestingly, research has found that these and 
other effects of being socially excluded are unaffected by closeness to the group or by the 
situation (Eisenberger et al., 2003; Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007). For example, people 
· are just as distressed from being ostracized by a KKK member as an in-group or rival 
out-group member (Gonsalkorale & Williams). The culmination of this research suggests 
that being excluded or avoided can in fact make an individual act more "hostile," "lazy," 
and "unintelligent," possibly causing African Americans to demonstrate characteristics 
that are consistent with the very stereotypes that are causing them to be avoided. 
Limitations and Future Research 
There are several limitations to this study that urge caution in interpreting the 
effects ( or lack of, in this case) of mortality salience on behavior. This study was 
originally intended to incorporate a death thought accessibility measure (Greenberg, 
Arndt, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2001; Schimel et al., 2007) as a manipulation 
check to determine whether mortality salience was actually primed. The measure consists 
of20 word fragments, 6 of which can be completed with either a word associated or 
unassociated with death. However, by writing words associated with death, death would 
again be primed and another distraction task would be needed whereupon it would be 
unclear whether death was primed at this second time. A follow up study, using this death 
thought accessibility measure in place of the stereotypic descriptions, is necessary to 
determine whether thoughts of death were actually primed when participants read the 
three targets' summer descriptions and is currently in progress (Wadian, 2009). 
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As mentioned earlier, cyberball may have itself been a limitation to the current 
study. It may have not been sensitive enough of a measure to indicate avoidant behavior. 
Although it has been demonstrated to be a realistic simulation of catch (Eisenberger et al., 
· 2003; Williams & Jarvis, 2006), it has yet to be used as a dependent measure in published 
research. Similarly, people naturally do not want to ostracize others (Williams, 2007), 
which suggests that hypothesizing that participants would ostracize or socially exclude a 
worldview-threatening target may have been unrealistic and counter to people's natural 
behavior. 
The descriptions themselves may also have been a limitation to the study. As 
suggested earlier, they ~ay have primed moral values or unduly influenced differential 
preferences between the sexes, specifically in regard to the stereotype consistent 
description. Schimel et al. (1999) had similar concerns, suggesting that participants were 
reacting to the specific content of descriptions versus the overall stereotypicality. Further 
studies, however, found converging evidence that their results were not dependent on 
attitudes toward the stereotypic description (Schimel et al.). The current study, on the 
other hand, did not find the same results as Schimel et al., again suggesting the need for 
further study on explicit behaviors toward a worldview-threat. 
Future research should attempt to determine the true duration of mortality 
salience. It is well documented that mortality salience influences attitudes, but if 
mortality salience only influences attitudes or behaviors for a limited amount of time 
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under certain circumstance, how important is it in real life? Much research is needed on 
explicit behaviors, along with in-depth meta-analyses including null research to better 
understand the effects of mortality salience, when it occurs, and how much it actually 
affects behavior. 
Future research should also utilize other measures of avoidance, both explicit and 
· implicit, that can allow participants anonymously to demonstrate avoidant behavior. As 
an example, future research could use a methodology similar to Ochsman and Mathy's 
(1994, as cited in Solomon et al., 2004), in which avoidance is measured by how close 
participants sit to targets, as long as all targets are out-group members to determine 
whether results were a product of avoidance of a worldview-threatening target or 
increased in-group identification. Further research should also compare the use of explicit 
behavioral measures in comparison to anonymous behavioral measures in regards to 
TMT to determine if the results of the current study were due to the identifiability of 
participants' actions. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the current study demonstrates that although previous research has 
found that mortality salience can influence attitudes and anonymous behaviors, it does 
not seem to influence overt behavior toward a worldview-threatening out-group member. 
This finding suggests that death may not influence behavior and social interaction as 
much as once assumed. On the other hand, stereotypes and target stereotypicality 
definitely did affect attitudes and behaviors, which led to avoidance of a stereotypical 
African American male target regardless of mortality salience. The overall findings 
suggest that it is not thoughts of death that seem to truly influence whom we avoid or 
even prefer, but the degree to which they match our stereotypes. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 An additional analysis tested similarity ( e.g., how similar participants felt the 
target was to themselves) as a covariate. Similarity ratings did not have an effect on 
percent of ball tosses,ps > .18. Similarity toward the stereotype consistent target had a 
significant effect on favorability ratings, F(l, 122) = 29.98,p < .001, trait ratings, F(l, 
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'122) = 12.37,p = .001, and avoidance ratings F(l, 122) = 22.29,p < .001. However, 
analyses conducted with and without this similarity rating toward the stereotype 
consistent target demonstrated similar trends, and it was therefore left out of all analyses 
to conserve power. 
2 A chi-square analysis was conducted on participants' school affiliation 
categorization of targets. Analyses suggests that only the stereotype consistent and 
neutral targets were identified as being from TSU significantly more than chance, i' (1, N 
-· 
= 178) = 6.49,p = .01, x2 (1, N= 178) = 69.61,p < .001, respectively. 
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SUMMER DESCRIPTION QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please write a paragraph describing what you did last summer. 
APPENDIXB 
MORTALITY ATTITUDES PERSONALITY SURVEY 
On the following page are two open-ended questions. Please respond to them with 
your first, natural response. 
We are looking for peoples' gut-level reactions to these questions. 
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality assessment. Recent 
research suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us a 
considerable amount about the individual's personality. Your responses to this 
survey will be content-analyzed in order to assess certain dimensions of your 
personality. Your honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated . 
. 1. Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you. 
-2. Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you 
physically die and once you are physically dead. 
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality assessment. Recent 
research suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us a 
considerable amount about the individual's personality. Your responses to this 
survey will be content-analyzed in order to assess certain dimensions of your 
personality. Your honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated. 
1. Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of dental pain arouses in you. 
2. Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you 






"I spent the summer on campus, taking a summer engineering class for 9 credit hours. I 
also worked at a software company around 20 hours a week to help furnish my expenses . 
· I spent my free time playing chess with my roommate and reading. I actually re-read the 
Lord of the Rings series. I also spent a week with my family touring Europe. The Eiffel 
tower is amazing! All in all, I had a very productive and exciting summer." 
Stereotype consistent 
"All I did dis summer was sit around, watchin BET. that station is tight. If it aint to hot 
outside me and my boyz kick it by ballin at the courts. When the weekend comes its time 
to get my party on, its time to hit da clubs lookin for fine lookin honies. Somedays me 
and my boyz get crunked, holla at some shorties and do our thang. I just be keepin it 
real." 
Neutral 
"I spent the summer stuck in Nashville working as a lifeguard for TSU. I also took a 
class, since I was stuck here, so I don't have to stress this semester. I pretty much spent 
most ofmy free time hanging out with friends, watching movies, playing my X-box and 
even went out a couple nights. I also went home a couple times to visit family members 








NEED FOR CLOSURE 
Please indicate your level of agreement to the following statements from 1 {strongly 




1 2 3 4 5 6 not to 
respond 
1. I think that having clear rules 
and order at work is essential for 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
success. 
2. Even after I've made up my 
mind about something, I am 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
always eager to consider a 
different opinion 
3. I don't like situations that are 
uncertain. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4. I dislike questions which could 
be answered in many different 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ways. 
5. I like to have friends who are 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
unpredictable. 
6. I find that a well ordered life 
with regular hours suits my 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
temperament. 
7. When dining out, I like to go to 
places where I have been before 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
so that I know what to expect. 
8. I feel uncomfortable when I 
don't understand the reason why 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
an event occurred in my life. 
9. I feel irritated when one person 
disagrees with what everyone else 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
in a group believes. 
10. I hate to change my plans at 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
the last minute. 
11. I don't like to go into a 
situation without knowing what I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 





I 2 3 4 5 6 
Prefer not 
to respond 
12. When I go shopping, I have difficulty 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 deciding exactly what it is that I want. 
13. When faced with a problem I usually 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
see the one best solution very quickly. 
14. When I am confused about an 
important issue, I feel very upset. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15. I tend to put off making important 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 decisions until the last possible moment. 
16. I usually make important decisions 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 quickly and confidently. 
17. I would describe myself as indecisive. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18. I think it is fun to change my plans at 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 the last moment. 
19. I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a 
new situation without knowing what 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
might happen. 
20. My personal space is usually messy 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
and disorganized. 
21. In most social conflicts, I can easily 
see which side is right and which is 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
wrong. 
22. I tend to struggle with most decisions. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23. I believe that orderliness and 
organization are among the most 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 important characteristics of a good 
student. 
24. When considering most conflict 
situations, I can usually see how both 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
sides could be right. 
25. I don't like to be with people who are 
capable of unexpected actions. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26. I prefer to socialize with familiar 
friends because I know what to expect 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
from them. 
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27. I think that I would learn best in a 
class that lacks clearly stated objectives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
and requirements. 
28. When thinking about a problem, I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
consider as many different opinions on 
the issue as possible. 
29. I like to know what people are 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
thinking all the time. 
30. I dislike it when a person's statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
could mean many different things. 
31. It's annoying to listen to someone who 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
cannot seem to make up his or her mind. 
32. I find that establishing a consistent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
33. I enjoy having a clear and structured 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
mode of life. 
34. I prefer interacting with people whose 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
opinions are very different from my own. 
35. I like to have a place for everything 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
and everything in its place. 
36. I feel uncomfortable when someone's 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
meaning or intention is unclear to me. 
37. When trying to solve a problem I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
often see so many possible options that 
it's confusing. 
38. I always see many possible solutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
to problems I face. 
39. I'd rather know bad news than stay in 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
a state of uncertainty. 
40. I do not usually consult many 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
different opinions before forming my own 
view. 
41. I dislike unpredictable situations. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
42. I dislike the routine aspects of my 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
work (studies). 






Please indicate below how descriptive the following traits are of you. 
very quite a 
slightly a little moderately bit extremely 
1. cheerful 0 0 0 0 0 
2. disgusted 0 0 0 0 0 
3. attentive 0 0 0 0 0 
4. bashful 0 0 0 0 0 
5. sluggish 0 0 0 0 0 
6. daring 0 0 0 0 0 
7. surprised 0 0 0 0 0 
8. strong 0 0 0 0 0 
9. scornful 0 0 0 0 0 
10. relaxed 0 0 0 0 0 
11. irritable 0 0 0 0 0 
12. delighted 0 0 0 0 0 
13. inspired 0 0 0 0 0 
14. fearless 0 0 0 0 0 
15. disgusted 0 0 0 0 0 
16.sad 0 0 0 0 0 
17. calm 0 0 0 0 0 
18. afraid 0 0 0 0 0 
19. tired 0 0 0 0 0 
20. amazed 0 0 0 0 0 
21. shaky 0 0 0 0 0 
22.happy 0 0 0 0 0 
23. timid 0 0 0 0 0 
24. alone 0 0 0 0 0 
25. alert 0 0 0 0 0 
26. upset 0 0 0 0 0 
27. angry 0 0 0 0 0 
28. bold 0 0 0 0 0 
29. blue 0 0 0 0 0 




































very quite a prefer 
a little moderately extremely not to 
slightly bit 
respond 
31. active 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32. guilty 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33. joyful 0 0 0 0 0 0 
34. nervous 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35. lonely 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36. sleepy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
37. excited 0 0 0 0 0 0 
38. hostile 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39. proud 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40. jittery 0 0 0 0 0 0 
41. lively 0 0 0 0 0 0 
42. ashamed 0 0 0 0 0 0 
43. at ease 0 0 0 0 0 0 
44. scared 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45. drowsy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
46. angry at self 0 0 0 0 0 0 
47. enthusiastic 0 0 0 0 0 0 
48. downhearted 0 0 0 0 0 0 
49. sheepish 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50. distressed 0 0 0 0 0 0 
51. blameworthy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
52. determined 0 0 0 0 0 0 
53. frightened 0 0 0 0 0 0 
54. astonished 0 0 0 0 0 0 
55. interested 0 0 0 0 0 0 
56. loathing 0 0 0 0 0 0 
57. confident 0 0 0 0 0 0 
58. energetic 0 0 0 0 0 0 
59. concentrating 0 0 0 0 0 0 
60. dissatisfied 0 0 0 0 0 0 
with self 
very quite a 
prefer 






Research suggests that attitudes and perceptions about even very common everyday items 
may be related to basic personality characteristics. To further examine this idea, we 
would like you to complete the opinion questionnaire on the following page with your 
most natural response. 
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Opinion Questionnaire 1: Literature 
Please read the following short passage from a novel and answer the questions below it. 
The automobile swung clumsily around the curve in the red sandstone trail, now a mass 
of mud. The headlights suddenly picked out in the night-first on one side of the road, then on 
the other-two wooden huts with sheet metal roofs. On the right near the second one, a tower of 
course beams could be made out in the light fog. From the top of the tower a metal cable, 
invisible at its starting-point, shone as it sloped down into the light from the car before 
disappearing behind the embankment that blocked the road. The car slowed down and stopped a 
few yards from the huts. 
The man who emerged from the seat to the right of the driver labored to extricate himself 
from the car. As he stood up, his huge, broad frame lurched a little. In the shadow beside the car, 
solidly planted on the ground and weighed down by fatigue, he seemed to be listening to the 
idling motor. Then he walked in the direction of the embankment and entered the cone of light 
from the headlights. He stopped at the top of the slope, his broad back outlined against the 
darkness. After a moment he turned around. In the light from the dashboard he could see the 
chauffeur's black face, smiling. The. man signaled and the chauffeur turned of the motor. At once 
a vast cool silence fell over the trail and the forest. Then the sound of the water could be heard. 
The man looked at the river below him, visible solely as a broad dark motion flecked 
with occasional shimmers. A denser motionless darkness, far beyond, must be the other bank. By 
looking fixedly, however, one could see on that still bank a yellowish light like an oil lamp in the 
distance. The big man turned back toward the car and nodded. The chauffeur switched off the 
lights, turned them on again, then blinked them regularly. On the embankment the man appeared 
and disappeared, taller and more massive each time he came back to life. Suddenly, on the other 
bank of the river, a lantern held up by an invisible arm back and forth several times. At a final 
signal from the lookout, tlie man disappeared into the night. With the lights out, the river was 
shining intermittently. On each side of the road, the dark masses of forest foliage stood out 
against the sky and seemed very near. The fine rain that had soaked the trail an hour earlier was 
still hovering in the warm air, intensifying the silence and immobility of this broad clearing in the 
virgin forest. In the black sky misty stars flickered. 
How do you feel about the overall descriptive qualities of the story? 
1 2 3 





6 7 8 9 
very 
descriptive 




ATTITUDE AND TRAIT MEASURES 
Trait- Self Instructions 
Please rate yourself on the following scale as you think the other participants will 
perceive you from only your picture and the description of your summer by indicating 
your agreement with the character traits listed below. 
· Trait-Other Instructions 
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Please rate the person shown above on the following scale by indicating your agreement 




1 2 3 4 5 6 prefer not to 
respond 
1. Intelligent C C C C r C C 
2. Conceited C C C r C C C 
3. Nice C C C C C C r 
4. Arrogant C C C C, C, C, C 
5. Antisocial C C C C C C C 
6. Trustworthy C C C C C C, C 
7. Hostile C C C r r C C 
8. Hardworking C r C C C C r 
9. Athletic C C C C C C r 
10. Friendly C, C C C C C r 
11. Freeloader C C:, C r, r r C 
12. Productive C C r C C C C 
Attitude rating- Self: Instructions and Measures 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the statements below using the following 
scale. Remember; please rate these statements as you think others will perceive you 




1 2 3 4 5 6 prefer not to responc 
1. I think people will say that (" (" (" (" (" C (" 
'm a nice person. 
2. I think people will say they 
!Would be interested in getting (" ~ C r C (" (" (" 
foknowme. 
3. I think people will say they 
twould be interested in 0 r 0 0 r (" (" 
socializing with me. 
4. I think people will say they C r 0 r r (" r 
rwould want to avoid me. 
5. I think people will Slly that 
OC'm the kind of person they r r 0 (" r (" r 
!Would associate themselves 
iwith. 
6. I think people will say r C C r C r C lthey'd like to talk to me. 
7. I think people will say that 
~hey would like to work on a r C 0 C C r C 
school project with me. 
Attitude Rating- Other 
~ Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements about the person 
above using the following scale. 
Strongly Strongly 
!Disagree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 prefer not to respond 
1. I think I would like r 
~his person. 
r, r, r r r C 
2. I am interested in 
getting to know this r (", C 
' 
r 0 r r 
person. 
3. I am interested in 
socializing with this r r, 0 r " r, r r 
oerson. 
-
4. I would avoid this r (", 0 n r r r person. 
5. This person is not 
someone I would C 0 C C C r r 
associate with. 
6. I would not want to C r r 
talk to this person. 
C r C r 
7. I would want to 
:Work with this person r C 0 C r r r 




PERCEIVED FREQUENCY OF BALL TOSSES 
1. How often did you toss the ball to each of the other participants on a scale from 0-
100% (should add up to 100%). 
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2. How often did the following participants toss you the ball on a scale from 0-100% 
(should add up to 100%). 
APPENDIX K 
MANIPULATIONS CHECKS AND FILLERS 
Please respond to the following questions about the person shown above 
1. Which school do you think this person is from? 
UNI 
C: 
2. How old do you think this person is? L" 
3. What race is this person? I ---. -------- .. -. -.- .... --··· -. ------
4. How similar is this person to you? 



















5. Do you think this person is religious? 
Not at all Very 
Religious Religious 
Prefer 
r, ("'., r r r not to 
respond 
1 2 3 4 5 6 r 
6. If this person needed help, how likely would you be to help? 
Not at all 
Likely 
r r r r r 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Have you ever met or interacted with this person before? 
Yes No Don't know 
C 









r not to 
respond 
6 r 
Prefer not to respond 
r 
Prefer not to respond 
r 
9. Please rate on the following scale how stereotypical this person seems for 
his/her race? 
Not at all Very 
Stereotypical Stereotypical 
Prefer 
C r r r not to 
respon 
d 
1 2 3 4 5 6 r 
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